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BILLS BOL'GI{Irepresent bankers' and trade acceptances bought by Fed-
eral Reserve Banks from bill (acceptance) dealers and banks. The
Reserve Banks generally buy all prime bills offered at the buying
rates they establish.
BtLIS DIScOUNThD representthe amount of Federal Reserve creditmem-
ber banks obtain through borrowing from Reserve Banks. In 1929-33,
two principal formsof borrowing, both known as discounting,were
resorted to by member banks in order to maintain adequate reserves:
(i) rediscouflts of short-term commercial, industrial, agricultural, or
other business paper in the member banks' portfolios:(2) advances
to member banks on their own promissory notes, secured by paper
eligible for discounting or by government securities.
CoNTiNuous ANN1AL R.rr is a rate of change calculated by assuming
continuous compounding. It is the diflerence between the natural
logarithms of a variable at the terminal and initial dates divided by
the number of years separating those dates.
DrPOSIT-CURRENCY RATIOS the ratio of commercial bank deposits to
currency held by the public. The higher this ratio, the larger the
fraction of high.powered money in use as bank reserves, and hence
the larger the money stock, given high-powered money and the
deposit-reserve ratio. The effect on the money stock of a change in
this ratio depends on the size of the deposit-reserve ratio.
IJE?osIT.REsFRvEno is the ratio of commercial hank deposits to bank
reserves. The higher this ratio, the larger the amount of deposits
outstanding for a given amount of reserves. Any increase in the ratio
of deposits to reserves tends to produce a dram of currency into pub-
lic circulation, and hence changes the amount of reserves. The effect
on the money stock of a change in this ratio, therefore, depends on
the size of the deposit-currency ratio.
DIRECT PR.F.SSURF, nicritioned Ott p. 5, foOtnOte hii,iexplairicel On pp.
109-110.
1EDERAL RESERVE CLAIMS ON ThE pIBLIC ANI) BANKS t5 the difference
between Federal Reserve credit outstanding and Federal Reserve
holdings of U.S. government securities.
FEDERAL RESERVE CREDIT OLTSTANIMNG represents principally the loans
and investments of Federal Reserve Banks. It is the suni of billsbong ii r,bill,(I I 5(OU Ii ttd, E.S.OVt' I nuien tSC( tin ticsa iid
Rusti vt Rankredit.
FIA1- OFFliF.lONJElARY Aul1IORITIFS refers 10 the fiduciary contnibo.
lions of the Federal Reserve System and the Treasury to high.p.
ered money. High-powered money is a sum of Treasuryobligation5
and Federal Reserve obligations. Against some of these obligation5
the nirmetarv authorities hold nonliduciarv assets, e.g., goldstock
assets for gold certificates: Federal Reserve claims on the publicand
the banks. such as bills discounted or bills bought, Forsome Federal
Reserve notes and hank deposits at Federal Reserve Banks.Against
other obligations, the monetary authorities hold fiduciaryassets,
based on their fiat. e.g.. Federal Reserve holdings ofgovernment se-
curities for some Federal Reserve notes and hank deposits at Federal
Reserve banks.
il IGH-I'owtRFi) MONF:V is currency held hr the public, plus vaultcash
in banks, plus deposit liabilities of the Federal ReserveSystem to
t)aflks The total is called high.powercdmoney because one dollar
of such money held as bank reserves may give riseto the creation of
several dollars of deposits. Other things beingthe same (namely,
the deposit-reserve ratio and the deposit-currencyratio), any increase
in the total of high-powered money involves an equalpercentage in-
rease in the stock of motley.
ISIPuCIT PRices is the index of iices obtained by dividingnet national
product in current prices bnet national product Ifl 1929 prices.
\foxrT.ARY AUTHORITIES are government bodiesthat exercise ultimate
power os-er the determination of the totalamount of money in ex-
istence. The principal monetary authoritiesin the United States
since uquhave been the Federal ReserveSystem and the Treasury
\JoNFSTOrK is the seasonally adjustedsum of currency and deposits
it commercial banks held b- the public: inpresent Federal Reserve
terminolo itis the sun-i of currency outsidebanks., .djuted dc
uiiand deposits, and commercial banktime deposits.
\rt x-sio.i, I'RoOtc.-l- is usedintel-changeably with national income
the useasure ol net nationalproduct is variant III, computed by
'nion Kuinets in Capital in (hr 4ror,canEcononi: Its Formation
and Finaicing, Princeton forNBER,tg6i.
PROXIMATE UITFRMI\.k\TSor THE MONEY STOCKare the three majol
quantities we distinguish throughwhich ans' changesfl the stock of money lU) must. arithnieticaJy,occur:(i) high-powered money
132H); () depusit-rescr' c ratio U) (lcpusit.( uirrncy







See A Monrtar' History, Appendix B. for the reasons for selecting
these three determinants and for the method used to divide
a change in the money stock into the fraction attributable to each
separately and to interaction between the two ratios.
RESERVES OF BANKS equal high-powered moneheld 1w commercial
banks, and consist ofault cash in banks PIUS deposit liabilities of
the Federal Reserve System to banks, Itis nor the sum of reserves
as viewed by individual banks, which regard their deposits at other
banks as reserves, It is the amount that would appear on a consoli-
dated balance sheet of the commercial banks, in which inteibank
deposits cancel out
VELOCITY is the ratio oF net national product in current prices to the
money stock. The money stock is the estimated average stock for the
time unit (generally, a calendar year) to which the net national
product refers.
liiPrimary Sources
iN WRrnNcA Monezaiy History, we did not haveaccess to the internal
documents of the Federal Reserve System dealing withmonetary pol
icy. We were therefore pleased by theannouncement in August 1964.
of the intention of the Board of Governors of theFederal Reserve Sys-
tem to make available to scholars most such documentsCovering the
period 1914.60. These will make itunnecessary in future researchto
rely as heavily as we did on the following primarysources.
The Goldenwe,ser Papers. Fora description of the papers and their
author, see pp Si -52. footnote407,trot pp.I 21-I 22, tootot
The Diary of Charles S. Hamlin. 1-lamlinwas a Boston lawyer whowas
appointed to the Federal Reserve Board inAugust 1914 for a two-
year term, and reappointed for ten-year termsfl igi6 and 1926, serv-
ing until 1936. when he was appointedspecial counsel. He kepta
detailed record of his daily round of activities,including proceedings
of the Board.
The George Leslie Harrison Paperson the h'deral Rseri'e System
Harrison was a deputy governor(1920-28). the goernot- (lq28-3tj
and president (1936.41) of theFederal Reservt' Bank of NewYork
Harrison's personal files, covering theperiod of his association with
the Bank(1920.40),contain many official memorandaand other doc-
uments. Items are identified by the titlesof sections of the Papers,
as follows: Conversations, 1926-40 (citedas Harrison, Conversations)
Office Memoranda,1921-40 (Harrison, Officc, both recordsof con-
versations, with some duplicationN1ice1Ianeous Letters and Re-
ports. 1920-40 (Harrison, Miscellaneous),Copies of correspondence
with the Federal ReserveBoard and others: OpenMarket Invest-
nient Committee, 1928-fo (Harrison,Open Market), minutes ofregu- lar meetings, nleetingsof the eccutis'c committee,memoranda, cot-
respondence resolutions: GovernorsConferencei q2I -o (Harrison. Governors), detailed agendafor meetings: DiscussionNotes, iq'o-o (Harrison, Notes),minut(s of meetings of thc boardof directors oi the Federal ReserveBank ofc5v \'ork and of the executivecorn- Inittee: Special Memoranda,i 93-10 (Harrison. Speciil). discussions of policquestions prepared by the Bank'sresearch stat-Iw!,_.___ s1_.
SOURCES OF Cl-I ARTS
Cu SAT t6 Simon Kuziiric. (. apita(ii thr .1 ire, ran t:corio,;ivPt ItlCtjliiiNil ER
191from worksheets iiiiite!l trigth(siwsk.variantIll, Colnponen( fliethmi.
money ncoinr and rca Incorrte)SI orreI 150)11 it' ills deii liv real I rrcorr(ill) p cii price deflator). A Mo'rrla,r History,ahk A}. 7o.7 3. col. H (iiifliSCV stock),
TbIe A-s, P. 774Oil.I(selouty of WOi5V). Hiiior,i-iiI SlatIstir-sof the Urijfrcj
States. 178019.1 . Bureau of the (.CIISIIS. 1949, p. 344 (wholesale pricei Ildex) in.
dias(rut( Pvoductro, 1Q') Rx'ision, Board of (ovCri]ors of the FederalRcscrs
Stenr, 960. p. SI 't(rttdtiirial prodisclioii(. ih National ltire'Research on
indicators of Cyclical Revivals arid Recessuini NRER. ICC. iqfio)) reference
nun).
CHART 27.4 ,lfonrtirrn History.FsIiIe .PP71 5715. oils.p. a
CHART 28: ijusineir Cycle ir,d,narorc. C. H. Moore, cd., Princton for N8ER.ii6
'dII. p.9txi sonal income). liiiloriral Statistics 'sj the (nitrd Stairs,i7X,
,,, Bureau of the (.cnsus. 1q49. p. 344 (wholesale price in(kx). iridisi:rial Pro.
durti'in, 1950 Rei'isio,i, Boa iii of 5,osm-roots of the Federal kecerse SystmsiI0li-i
p. S'ri(industrial prodution).
Citstr 29:Co,n.nmori'.$tock lridexei, I":.s;;, Cowli'(;onlrnjissjon for Research in
Economics. Bloormiirsgion, lirti., Principia Press. 1938. p. 67 kons'nonstock price
index). fiankirrmind .ltorreinzry \lmSiiit;ec, Board of Gosertiors of thefederal Re
serve ,istenl.943. 4";(5.'(I(usiiimrmerctal paper rate(; pp. 46(5.470icld on
corporate bonds, Baa, and on L'S. gucerninent Isonils): p. 441(discount rac,
CHART 3O Federal Reserve !rslleti,i, Sepi. 1937. p. qoq.
CHARt 3tA Monetar5' History, Table At, pp. 712.713, to). H. and rahie B1,pp fl3.flij4 cob. I.2. 3.
CH.SRT 32A. Liabilities, .4fonrtai's Htitory, 1 aIsle 11.3.)p. Hii3.$ii4tol I(high.
powered moons); Tahlc pp. 73(1-7411. col. a (hank deposits at Fedetal Resetc
Rankst; lttsnkcng and Montmsry .taf:ltici, pp. .411.fI2}edrI Recerse notes
Tieasiircurrency, gold cointiil gold ten iltcj ics) .plus S2$7 101 Ilioti dcductcij bs
Federal Reserxe added back to gold coin. seaso,tallsirljtisied livtic.
B. Assets. ibid., p. (Ilionetar'. golil stotki pins 55117 rtiillinmrileiliitc'iIlFed
eral Reierve added back, seascitiallsnljiisredIstic; 1P ''7!i, Fccln-r.il Rese'
credit otititantling and Sc stem liohltnc iiiIS goc 1'! ii!ile'lii5Cr unties liTre etscli
corrected (ortrastnissltutu r'riieuitc, and thelatter-suiliir.ictcmlfioiiintrcfist itici
(Federal Reserve claims on the pitlilic and loOks); highPols err'nI nioucstitinirs
Iflofletary quit) stock mu ntis F'edcra I Reserve c its irim S oil I lit' pus) Ic and ha msks(oilier
phssncai assets arts)Ii at of the flionc' tars.i u thor itt's).
CHrAt: Banflnng 'ord .forietiary .Stti)tirr, pp. ''y';71u tFrder.iI Reserve credit lint
sianriiiig. L'Sgulserilupirot serIirI(lc.s held. huilklimuiritsred; lulls liotigluli. cr45011
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